This chapter discusses some key issues in the application of dynamic general equilibrium analysis to open economy modelling. In the context of the new open economy macroeconomics paradigm, we focus on: (i) the currency denomination of sticky prices; (ii) the role of the current account and net foreign assets; and (iii) the impact of Þscal policy.
Introduction
This chapter highlights some key topics in understanding the dynamic general equilibrium An open-economy DGE model must contain a number of essential elements. Household preferences must be speciÞed: this is more complex than in a closed-economy model since the elasticity of substitution between home-and foreign-produced goods must be speciÞed. This also applies to the speciÞcation of production functions since imported intermediate goods represents a potentially important linkage across economies. The international dimension of asset trade must also be speciÞed, detailing whether home and foreign households share risks via state-contingent assets or just engage in bond trade or face even more restricted opportunities for international Þnancial transactions. Of course, the form of nominal rigidities must also be determined (sluggishness in goods prices versus wages; the duration of rigidities): in an open economy, the researcher faces the problem of deciding the currency denomination of these sticky goods or factor prices. Finally, the nature of monetary and Þscal policies must be incorporated. Again, policy formation in an open economy involves extra dimensions in Þxing the domestic policy response to foreign disturbances and evaluating whether there are gains to international policy coordination. Lane (2001) and Sarno (2001) provide broad surveys of this recent literature on "sticky" DGE (NOEM) models that was initiated by the seminal Redux model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) . Our strategy in this chapter is to focus on some key issues that are at the core of current research on open-economy DGE modelling. In particular, we consider: the currency denomination of sticky prices; the role of the current account and net foreign assets in adjustment dynamics; and the analysis of Þscal policy in an open economy. As already noted, the Þrst two topics raise issues that are by deÞnition absent from closedeconomy analysis; we also highlight the third topic, since it has received comparatively less attention than monetary analysis in the recent literature but represents a critical channel by which policymakers inßuence the behaviour of the international economy.
The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 considers the currency denomination of sticky prices. The role of the current account and net foreign assets in the adjustment process is considered in section 3. We turn to the analysis of Þscal policy in NOEM models in section 4. Conclusions are offered in section 5.
The Currency Denomination of Sticky Prices

Optimal Exchange Rate and Monetary Policies
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996a) assumed that prices were sticky in the currency denomination of the producer: US Þrms set prices in dollars, Japanese Þrms in yen and so on. Such producer currency pricing (PCP) implies an active expenditure-switching role for the nominal exchange rate: if the dollar depreciates, this implies a reduction in the euro-currency price of US exports which in turn should raise demand for these goods from eurozone purchasers. Devereux (1996, 2000) and others have rather preferred an alternative speciÞcation under which Þrms set prices in the currency of the purchaser: such local currency pricing (LCP) of course requires that the Þrm is able to segment markets since prices to purchasers in different locations are potentially different under this scheme. 1 Under LCP, 1 It is empirically well documented that deviations from the law of one price are widespread even for goods that are commonly traded in international markets (see, for example, Engel 1993, Froot and Rogoff the exchange rate does not have a direct allocative role: a surprise nominal depreciation does not alter the prices facing purchasers and so does not induce substitution between domestic and imported goods. Rather, exchange rate movements just have income effects by altering the rate at which given foreign currency revenues convert into domestic currency and vice-versa.
In general, this "pass-through" debate concerns the elasticity
where p is the (log) domestic-currency purchase price, e is the (log) nominal exchange rate and λ is the elasticity. Full PCP and LCP correspond to λ = 1 and λ = 0 respectively, with intermediate values representing partial degrees of pass through. As emphasized by
Obstfeld (2001), p need not refer to a consumer price: intermediates comprise much of international trade. Moreover, it should be recognized that LCP is not the only source of a weak contemporaneous relation between exchange rates and consumer prices -as is surveyed by Engel (2002) , shipping costs, nontraded distribution services and optimal price discrimination may also inhibit exchange rate pass through.
The recent literature has paid much attention to the comparison of PCP and LCP (ie differences in degree of pass through from exchange rates to the prices facing purchases) in terms of its implications for optimal monetary and exchange rate policies. Although the initial contributions in the NOEM Þeld focused on certainty equivalence settings, the work that has followed Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) has adopted an explicitly stochastic framework in evaluating policy regimes. This is important, since it highlights the role of uncertainty in determining the average levels of macroeconomic variables: risk-averse agents will typically build in risk premia into wages and prices in response to an uncertain environment. In turn, this implies that uncertainty has Þrst-order effects on welfare. Under PCP, the standard Þnding is that a ßoating exchange rate system is optimal in allowing economies to adjust to asymmetric real shocks for standard Friedmanite reasons (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001, 2002) . Under LCP, the gains to ßoating in adjusting to shocks are reduced, since the exchange rate does not facilitate stabilization in that case (Devereux and Engel 2001a ).
Corsetti and Pesenti (2002a) make the point that LCP limits the desirability of exchange rate ßexibility, even if output could be perfectly stabilized under a ßoat. The reason is that exchange rate movements under LCP imply deviations from the law of one price. In turn, this increases the risk facing foreign exporters, who respond by incorporating a risk premium into prices that reduces the average real incomes of domestic households -in general, the optimal policy must trade off a larger output gap against lower import prices.
However, Sutherland (2001a) shows that a ßexible exchange rate may be desirable with even a low degree of pass through if the elasticity of labor supply is low. 3 The reason is that exchange rate volatility induces exporters to set high prices, which has the effect of improving the terms of trade.
Devereux and Lane (2001a) provide a quantitative exploration for a small open economy. Their setup involves a competitive export sector that faces exogenously-determined world prices and a monopolistic nontraded sector that displays Calvo-style nominal price stickiness. The consumption good is imported. Two scenarios for the degree of passthrough for import prices are considered: complete pass through; and partial pass through, set at the same degree of rigidity as shown by prices in the nontradable sector. Shocks to world interest rates and the terms of trade are considered. The results of the numerical simulations are shown in Table 1 
Endogeneity of PCP versus LCP
The preceding discussion begs the question of the endogenous determination of the currency denomination of sticky prices. A DGE approach highlights that Þrms should take into account the covariance between exchange rates and the marginal utility of consumption of its household shareholders in setting prices. In contrast, the partial equilibrium literature typically assumes a risk-neutral Þrm, which rules out consideration of such general equilibrium effects.
Devereux and Engel (2001b) study this problem in a general equilibrium setting in which money supplies are subject to random variability and households are risk averse. 5 These foreign Þrms follow LCP vis-a-vis home consumers, with foreign consumers facing uncertain prices. If Þnancial markets are incomplete, in contrast, a symmetric LCP equilibrium is feasible so long as absolute monetary variability is not too large in either country and the degree of risk aversion is not too low. However, a symmetric PCP equilibrium is only feasible in the knife-edge case when monetary variability is identical in the two countries.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2001b) provide an alternative approach and highlight that two key factors are the market share of home Þrms in the foreign market and the greater the market power of individual Þrms. 6 If home Þrms have a high market share and the elasticity of intrasectoral substitutability is low, then a PCP equilibrium is likely. This is reinforced by a strategic complementarity in price setting: PCP is more attractive, the more other home Þrms also pursue this strategy. 7 Corsetti and Pesenti (2002b) make a useful contribution to this debate. Rather than focusing on monetary uncertainty, they allow monetary policies to be optimally determined.
In addition, Þrms are free to choose any degree of pass-through. They show that there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium, exchange rates ßoat and Þrms select PCP strategies;
in the other, the exchange rate is Þxed and an LCP equilibrium is feasible. In this way, a currency union can be self-validating, since Þxed exchange rates are an optimal monetary policy response to LCP strategies, given that exchange rate shifts have no allocative role in that case. However, it is important to note that these equilibria are Pareto-rankable: the ßoat/PCP equilibrium offers higher expected welfare compared to the Þx/LCP alternative.
The reason of course is that the former conÞguration allows the exchange rate to be a helpful adjustment mechanism in the face of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks.
Country size and, relatedly, the nature of the distribution process are also surely important. For instance, Devereux et al (1999) conjecture that the introduction of the euro will make it more likely that imports into the eurozone will be priced in euro rather than in foreign currency. Since such a switch insulates the eurozone price level from exchange rate volatility, the welfare of European consumers is enhanced. Moreover, under international risk-sharing, foreign agents also beneÞt through an associated increase in European asset prices.
Undoubtedly, much remains to be done in terms of understanding the currency denomination of prices. The highest priority is surely the acquisition of improved empirical evidence on the price setting behavior: in this regard, the formation of EMU provides a natural experiment. In related fashion, a better understanding of the determination of the currency denomination of debt contracts is also an important desideratum. to external disturbances that shift global output, even if domestic production is unchanged.
As a modelling strategy, the assumption of complete international Þnancial markets is attractive, since asymmetric shocks do not alter the international wealth distribution. 9 Even if PPP does not hold (as under LCP, for instance), this assumption also provides an extremely simple relation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate µ C
where ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, P and P * are the home and foreign consumer price levels respectively and E is the level of the nominal exchange rate. Here, we have assumed that complete insurance extends to nominal incomes: at an optimum, transferring a dollar between home and foreign agents cannot be a Pareto improvement.
Of course, however elegant, the tight link between the real exchange rate and relative consumption in equation [2] is profoundly rejected in the data (Ravn 2001).
As is emphasized by Pesenti (2001, 2002a) , another way to eliminate international wealth redistributions is to restrict consumption preferences in a particular way. 10 Suppose initial non-monetary wealth is zero and utility from consumption is given
where C s is an unitary-elasticity aggregate over home and foreign goods
and the corresponding consumer price index is
with the same preferences applying also to foreign households. Then, it can be shown that households just spend their income each period
where R s is the revenue from sales to domestic and export markets. Under PCP, this result applies even for a non-unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution: it is sufficient that the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is one. The intuition is straightforward: current account imbalances will tend not to arise if there is limited substitutability between home and foreign products in consumption.
Although it promotes model tractability, ruling out current account and net foreign asset dynamics by either approach is quite limiting. The original Redux model emphasized that a monetary shock could be non-neutral even in the long-run, since it generates a shortrun current account surplus and a corresponding long-run improvement in the net foreign asset position. In turn, this generates permanent wealth effects that alter the long-run patterns of consumption, work effort and the terms of trade.
The Redux model adopted a certainty-equivalence framework and just considered a At an empirical level, net foreign asset positions tend to be quite persistent (Lane 11 Benigno (2001) and Kollmann (2002) provide examples of employing a debt-elastic interest rate premium to ensure stationarity. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a) document some suggestive evidence in support of such a "portfolio balance" effect: there is a positive correlation between the ratio of net external liabilities to exports and real interest rate differentials. 12 These authors Þnd very slow convergence back to steady-state. In part, this is because they follow Weil (1989) and assume households are inÞnitely-lived but population growth means that new cohorts are born each period, rather than adopting the Þnite-horizon formulation as in Blanchard (1985) . Ghironi 
where y t and π
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are the deviation of output and CPI inßation from their steady-state (trend) values. 16 This particular monetary policy rule leads to some interesting dynamics.
For instance, consider the impact of an accumulation of net foreign assets. Since this generates a positive wealth effect that leads to a reduction in work effort, domestic output falls even though domestic consumption is raised.
The Taylor rule in equation (7) instructs the central bank to reduce interest rates whenever it observes a fall in output below its steady-state value (regardless of its source): the positive accumulated net foreign asset position is thereby associated with a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Another implication of this rule is that there is a forecastable component to the nominal exchange rate: the accumulated net foreign asset position pre-dictably inßuences the interest rate under equation (7), through the wealth effect on labor supply and thereby on the level of output. Integrating the macroeconomic impact of dramatic shifts in international Þnancial market sentiment into the NOEM framework appears to be a useful direction for future research. 19 Of course, understanding the sources of these market swings is a primary concern in assessing the net gains to international Þnancial integration. A related issue is that allowing non-fundamental Þnancial market shocks (in conjunction with incomplete risk sharing)
can help improve the empirical performance of NOEM models. For instance, Devereux and 17 The strength of this mechanism is the larger, the higher the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods in consumption. This model maintains the PCP assumption. 18 Examining the behavior of such rules for the ßexible-price case also seems to be a digression, since such monetary policy rules only make sense if there is some degree of nominal rigidity. 19 Cook and Devereux (2001) provide an interesting application of such a model to the Asian crisis . 
Fiscal policy in NOEM models
In this section we survey how NOEM models have been used to analyze Þscal issues. Despite the fact that this framework is equipped to study the effects of Þscal shocks, relatively few authors focus on them. We start by illustrating how government spending can be introduced into the Redux model, and we subsequently look at the effects of Þscal shocks in variants of the basic model that incorporate various features such as LCP strategies; Þnancial frictions; perfect risk sharing; home-bias; non-separability between private and public consumption;
Þxed exchange rates; and deviations from Ricardian Equivalence.
Government spending in the Redux model
Government spending is introduced in the basic Redux model by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) in the form of a composite of public consumption that aggregates across the differentiated 20 Kollmann (2002) studies a small open economy. He argues that shocks to UIP actually improve welfare, since the country will hold higher net foreign assets in response and hence enjoy a greater mean level of consumption.
goods produced by the individual agents in the same way as for private consumption, with the same elasticity of substitution. Accordingly, domestic government spending is given by
where [0, 1] is the continuum of goods produced in the domestic and foreign countries and θ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Formula (8) also illustrates the absence of home bias in government spending in the Redux model. In this framework world government spending G w t enters as an exogenous shock to the demand schedule faced by every agent for its product
where [p t (z)/P t ] is its relative price and C w t and G w t are global private and government consumption spending respectively. In the Redux model, a permanent balanced-budget increase in home government spending reduces short-run relative consumption and depreciates the exchange rate. The intuition for this result is that, with no home bias in government spending, such a policy increases the demand for both domestic and foreign goods, while the tax bill only falls on domestic residents. This implies a negative wealth effect for home agents, who react by reducing their consumption relative to foreigners. Because money demand is a positive function of consumption, the fall in relative consumption brings about a depreciation of the domestic currency.
A domestic balanced-budget increase in government spending also raises output in the home country and lowers it abroad. The positive effect on domestic output is consistent with results previously derived in the Real Business Cycle (RBC) tradition. 21 Under ßexible prices, this can be explained by the fact that an increase in taxes reduces wealth, inducing agents to redce their consumption of leisure and increae labour supply. In contrast, under sticky prices, output is demand determined and so its positive response cannot be explained by supply-side factors. An intuition for the increase in domestic output can rather be found 21 For example, Baxter and King (1993) .
in the expenditure-switching effect that follows the depreciation of the domestic currency which raises demand for domestic goods. 22 Since both leisure and consumption provide utility in this framework, the above analysis suggests that a domestic Þscal expansion has beggar-thyself and prosper-thy-neighbor welfare implications.
The effects of permanent Þscal expansions on the current account and on the real interest rate are in stark contrast with the implications of ßexible-price, representative agent models.
If θ + 1 is bigger than the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of real balances ², the home country runs a current account surplus following a domestic expansion. 23 This is due to the fact that, unlike in ßexible-price models, the presence of sticky prices means that an unanticipated permanent increase in government spending can tilt the time proÞle of output, thereby inducing current account effects.
A permanent Þscal policy shock reduces the short-run real interest rate. 24 The intuition is that the effect on output is larger in the short-run than in the long-run on account of the the temporary nominal rigidity. This implies a declining path of output available for private consumption. It follows that a decrease in the short-run real interest rate is required, in order to make the individual optimal consumption smoothing consistent with this dynamics.
While all the effects discussed above refer to an increase in government spending that is Þnanced with lump-sum taxes, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) also consider the case of an income tax. When distortionary taxation is introduced, initial steady-state output is lower than in the case in which the only distortion is imperfect competition. It follows that both countries potentially gain more from an unanticipated increase in world demand than in the 22 By the same token, we can explain the decrease in foreign output following a domestic expansion.
Since the domestic effect is stronger in absolute value, world output increases. 23 Note that this condition is always satisÞed in the particular case of logarithmic preferences, in which ² = 1. This follows from the fact that the elasticity of substitution between goods θ must be bigger than unity in order to have well deÞned demand functions. Note that the consumption elasticity of money demand in the model is given by 1/ε. 24 This is a novelty compared to the ßexible-price textbook result of no effect on the interest rate (Barro 1993) case of lump-sum taxes. In the case of a monetary shock, the overall beneÞt is redistributed towards the depreciating country, that can reduce the distortion due to income taxes at foreign expense.
A feature of the Redux model, as it is clear from equation (9), is a constant elasticity of demand, that implies a Þxed mark-up of prices on marginal costs. While enhancing tractability, this rules out some interesting possibilities. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) , for example, show that allowing for intra-industry strategic collusion can generate a countercyclical mark-up following an unexpected Þscal shock. Gali (1994) and Dixon and Rankin (1994) make the point that changing the public-private spending mix also alters the elasticity of total demand if the elasticity of public spending is different from that of private spending. 25 In this way, endogenizing the degree of imperfect competition could improve our understanding of the effects of Þscal policy. The subsequent literature that has built on the Redux model has also highlighted some other limitations of the basic framework, as well as its ßexibility in terms of introducing more realistic assumptions. In what follows, we illustrate how researchers have attempted to deal with some of these issues in relation to Þscal policy.
Fiscal policy: PCP versus LCP
As was discussed in section 2, a feature of the Redux model that has been deemed as unrealistic is the PCP assumption that requires the law of one price (LOOP) and PPP to always hold. Most of the contributions that deal with Þscal policy, however, use the PCP approach. This modelling choice can probably be considered less problematic when dealing with Þscal shocks than when dealing with monetary ones, in light of the results illustrated in Betts and Devereux (1999) . Using calibration experiments, these authors show that deviations from the LOOP, although crucial in affecting the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks, are relatively unimportant for the case of Þscal shocks. 26 The interdependence pattern following a tax-Þnanced increase in government spending is essentially the same as in the Redux model regardless of the denomination of sticky prices.
A noteworthy exception is that with LCP the nominal exchange rate slightly overshoots in the short run. This difference with the Redux result of no overshooting is due to the fact that with LCP the foreign price level does not move immediately and the rise in the price level is smaller than in the PCP case. This in turn implies that the reduction in relative consumption is slightly reduced and hence an overshooting of the exchange rate is required to clear the money market.
Senay (1998) analyzes the impact of Þscal policy in a LCP framework that also incorporates Þnancial frictions. Senay conÞrms, in a LCP framework, that Þnancial integration reduces the volatility of consumption, output and the nominal exchange rate following an asymmetric Þscal shock. 27 However, she Þnds that the way in which Þnancial integration operates does not signiÞcantly depend on the degree of LCP in the economy.
Fiscal policy and perfect risk sharing
Betts and Devereux (1999) also show that the asset market structure is crucial in affecting the results following a Þscal shock. When asset markets are complete, the wealth effects of Þnancing the increased government spending are shared equally by the two countries.
Domestic and foreign variables therefore react in the same way. Both home and foreign output increase, while consumption falls, and there are no exchange rate and current account effects.
In the Redux model, the degree of monopolistic competition and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods are equal. As was discussed in section 2, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) develop a model that sets a unitary elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. Under PCP, this formulation provides the same kind of risk 26 On the other hand, the asset market structure is very important in the Þscal case (see below), and irrelevant in the monetary one. 27 The same result is found by Sutherland (1996) .
sharing implied by complete markets for the case of Þscal shocks. The Þscal results of these authors however differ from those of Betts and Devereux (1999), since they introduce complete home bias in government spending. When a domestic Þscal shock stimulates the demand for home goods only, foreign output, the nominal exchange rate, home and foreign consumption are unaffected in the short-run, while home output increases on a one-to-one basis. 28 It follows that the welfare spillover of a Þscal expansion is determined solely by the longrun effects. A foreign increase in government spending affects the home economy through two channels. The Þrst channel is a depreciation of the domestic real exchange rate, that reduces the domestic purchasing power parity and consumption. The welfare spillover of this channel is unambiguously negative. Since a Þscal expansion in the foreign country reduces the amount of foreign goods available to world consumers, the world demand for domestic goods increases if domestic and foreign goods are substitutes, and decreases if they are complements. The sign of the welfare spillover is negative when the two national goods are substitutes, because domestic production increases and domestic leisure falls.
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) conclude that the negative channel prevails for a wide range of parameters. In their model therefore, unlike in the Redux, Þscal spillovers are likely to be beggar-thy-neighbor.
A feature of the way Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) specify preferences is that solutions can be derived in closed form, without resorting to linearization. Their model is therefore well equipped to carry out a choice-theoretic analysis of policy coordination. In particular, they analyze the interplay between monetary and Þscal policy links, by deriving the optimal 28 This property, which can be labelled "quasi-neutrality", is common in models with home bias in government spending (an early example is Rankin 1990). Ganelli (2000) argues that introducing home bias in government spending in the Redux model generates "quasi-neutrality" of Þscal shocks. Warnock (1998) introduces home bias in the Redux model in the form of idiosyncratic preferences, rather than in the composition of spending, Þnding that a higher degree of home bias increases the depreciation of the domestic currency and therefore increases the probability that the home country runs a surplus following a domestic Þscal expansion.
monetary policy as a function of the parameters of the model and of the other (domestic and foreign) policy variables. Since a home Þscal expansion increases domestic output in the short-run, bringing the domestic economy closer to potential output at unchanged terms of trade, the optimal monetary response is a contraction of domestic money supply. As noted above, domestic Þscal shocks have no impact on the foreign economy in the short-run. The foreign authorities therefore do not need to react directly too such a policy, but they will implement the optimal response to any monetary contraction of the home country caused by a domestic Þscal shock.
Useful government spending
Ganelli (2000) introduces utility enhancing government spending in the Redux model, by modelling private and public consumption as substitutes in private utility. The representative agent therefore maximizes the following utility function:
where γ is the marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption, Ganelli (2000) also shows that introducing utility enhancing government spending increases home welfare, following a domestic expansion, compared to the Redux benchmark.
This follows from the fact that the direct increase in utility caused by such an expansion more than offset the negative welfare effect arising from the reduction in consumption due to direct crowding out. The differential effect of introducing γ > 0 therefore moderates the beggar-thyself nature of Þscal policy highlighted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995 
Macroeconomic effects of government debt
A common feature of all the policy experiments considered so far is that they are balancedbudget expansions or contractions. This follows from the fact that, with inÞnitely lived agents, Ricardian equivalence holds and there is no role for government debt. Ganelli In this framework, each agent faces in every period a constant probability of death 1 − q. Unlike in the inÞnitely lived models previously described, it is here necessary to differentiate agents by age. The representative domestic agent of age a at time t therefore maximizes the expected utility function:
where q is the probability of surviving to next period. C a+s−t,s denotes consumption of an agent of age a + s − t at time s, and an analogous notation holds for the other variables. L denotes the amount of labor supplied in a perfectly competitive labor market. 29 Since the If such a policy is carried out by the domestic country, short-run relative (domestic minus foreign) consumption increases. This is achieved by means of an increase in the domestic level of consumption, while the effect on foreign consumption is ambiguous but likely to be positive as well. The fact that relative and absolute home consumption increase following a domestic Þscal shock illustrates the existence of a wealth effect that is not at work in the Ricardian models previously considered. Because of the deviation from Ricardian Equivalence, home agents are aware of the fact that there is a positive probability that they will not be alive next period, and therefore they will not have to pay the future tax-bill implied by the increase in debt. This explains why short-run domestic consumption 29 The departure form the yeoman-farmer model used in the Redux, where agents are both consumers and producers, is necessary to make aggregation across ages possible.
increases. The latter result in consistent with some recent empirical evidence regarding the effects of Þscal policy. 30 The fact that short-run relative consumption increases implies an appreciation of the exchange rate and a decrease in relative output. The short-run international output spillover is unambiguously positive. In contrast to the Redux model, introducing deviations from Ricardian equivalence can thereby make the NOEM paradigm more consistent with the predictions of the traditional Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch framework.
The long-run movements of output and consumption depend on the effect on net foreign assets. Ganelli shows that net foreign assets are a positive function of the short-run nominal exchange rate and a negative function of short-run relative consumption. 31 It follows that net foreign assets unambiguously decrease following a temporary debt-Þnanced tax cut.
Since there is an inverse steady-state relation between net foreign assets and the trade balance, long-run relative consumption and leisure must fall to offset the reduction in net foreign assets.
This discussion illustrates that is clearly possible to attribute real macroeconomic effects to government debt policies once the NOEM framework is suitably adapted to allow for deviations from Ricardian Equivalence. The analysis of Evans (1991) does suggest that the impact of simply moving from the representative-agent inÞnite-horizon case is quantitatively limited. However, Faruqee and Laxton (2000) show that the public debt can have larger effects if combined with non-ßat age-earnings proÞles and a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution. At an empirical level, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a) document that the level of government debt is an important driver of the net foreign asset position for both industrial and developing countries. The magnitude of the elasticity is larger for the latter group, which is in line with the view that departures from Ricardian Equivalence are 30 Fatas and Mihov (2001), using a VAR approach to study the effects of Þscal policy shocks in the US, stress the contrast between the positive effect on consumption that is in the data and the negative impact in their standard RBC theoretical model. They conclude that one important item in the agenda of research on Þscal policy is to develop theoretical models that bring theory closer to reality. 31 The net foreign asset position is also a negative function of relative government spending, that is kept constant in the policy under consideration.
likely to be larger for developing countries that are characterized by more severe Þnancial constraints on household and corporate borrowing.
Fiscal Policy: Other Dimensions
One direction for future research is to incorporate the stylized fact that a substantial proportion of government spending is used not for public consumption of privately-produced goods but rather to pay for employment in the public sector. None of the models that we have surveyed incorporates this feature. Finn (1998), using a ßexible-price RBC model,
shows how failing to distinguish between these two different sub-aggregates of government expenditure can lead to overestimation of the government's impact on the economic cycle. Since the econometric analysis of Þscal policy still in its infancy, it is also obvious that more empirical work aimed at testing the Þscal implications of these models would be welcome. Here, extending the recent techniques of Blanchard and Perotti (2001) and Fatas and Mihov (2001) to an open economy setting would be a welcome innovation: it would be extremely helpful to have evidence concerning the impact of Þscal policy on the exchange rate, the current account and interest rate differentials. As is illustrated by Favero (2002) , it is also important to study the joint impact of monetary and Þscal policies by allowing for interdependencies between the two instruments of macroeconomic policy management.
This chapter has discussed some key elements in DGE analysis of open economies and, along the way, has also signalled key issues to be addressed by future researchers. 32 One contribution of the NOEM literature has been to highlight the wide range of possible choices that exist in the speciÞcation of microfounded international DGE models: the Þxed assumptions in the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model concerning the relation between exchange rates and prices and the role played by the current account have been challenged, with myriad alternatives being offered. In terms of modelling strategy, we have emphasized that the choices required to obtain closed-form solutions may be potentially misleading in terms of identifying quantitatively-relevant speciÞcations.
Regarding the current state of the literature, there are encouraging signs that new technical progress is being made. In particular, developing second-order solutions to DGE models promises to be very helpful in improving welfare evaluation and the analysis of for the eurozone economy. In addition to such macroeconometric studies, more microeconomic evidence on international price setting and international Þnancial trade is highly desirable. 32 For reasons of space, this chapter has comparatively neglected the use of NOEM models for the analysis of international policy coordination issues. This is an exciting current branch of the literature:
Bergin (2002a) provides an accessible introduction. 
